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The “crisis” of the European border 
regime: Towards a Marxist theory  
of borders
Nicholas De Genova
Ever since Marx and Engels proclaimed in The Communist Manifesto that the workers have no country, it has been an elementary and defining premise of 
Marxist politics that we are internationalists.1 There has never been a more clear 
proof that Stalinism involved a radical betrayal of Marxism, furthermore, than 
the devious and self-serving proposition that it was possible to build “socialism 
in one country”. Indeed, the prominence of the word “international” in the name 
of this journal is meant to confirm its commitment to a specifically Marxist 
socialist politics while also emphatically distinguishing itself from the wretched 
counter-revolutionary legacy of Stalinism. It is instructive to take this funda-
mental internationalist perspective of any genuinely Marxist politics as a starting 
point for any Marxian reflection on questions of migration and borders. After 
all, we are left to wrestle with a very meaningful and consequential paradox: the 
1 This article has benefited from the critical comments and thoughtful suggestions of Ruben 
Andersson, Glenda Garelli, Fiorenza Picozza, Maurice Stierl and Martina Tazzioli, who each 
responded to an earlier draft. In addition, this text has been inspired by dialogue and debate 
within the research network on “The ‘European’ Question: Postcolonial Perspectives on 
Migration, Nation, and Race”. I am also grateful to all those who shared their insights and 
criticisms during various public presentations, particularly Alex Callinicos, Charles Heller, 
Sandi Hilal, Stathis Kouvelakis, Simon Parker, Alessandro Petti, Lucia Pradella and Eyal 
Weizman.
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workers have no country, and yet we live in a world of supposedly separate and 
distinct “countries”—a world partitioned into “national” states. 
A Marxist politics of internationalism must necessarily offer a rigorous 
critique of nationalism, but there can be no adequate critique of nationalism 
without a theory of the state, particularly as “the” state everywhere refers to a 
multiplicity of separate and distinct states, which usually fashion themselves 
quite emphatically as “national”. Given the global configuration of the capitalist 
world economy, we must therefore be able to account for why it is that instead of 
a global state, we have a great proliferation of territorially defined and delimited 
(nation) states. Therefore, understanding the very process by which a state is 
thus territorially delimited—understanding, in other words, how a state comes 
to be defined by borders—should be a central problem in accounting for the 
relation between the territorially-defined (“national”) state and global capital. 
Furthermore, if the workers as a class on a global scale have no country, there 
is surely no better lived and embodied example of this proposition than those 
migrant workers who cross nation state borders. In short, international migra-
tion is never separable from the global mobility of labour, and any meaningful 
socialist internationalism must begin from this fact. In this respect, theoretically 
speaking, there can literally be no viable socialist internationalism that does not 
take migrant labour as a premier subject of any radical working class politics.
In this article, I will start by reflecting on the beleaguered figures of migra-
tion and refugee movements into and across Europe, and therefore will also 
examine the equivocal figure of the borders of this ambiguous and amorphous 
place called “Europe.” We must begin by interrogating what has variously been 
called the “migrant crisis” or the “refugee crisis”, which is otherwise taken to 
signal a “crisis” of Europe’s borders. Beyond an examination of the prolifera-
tion of discourses of “crisis,” however, I also want to trouble the very figure of 
“Europe”. Finally, I want to suggest the outline of a way of theorising this osten-
sible “crisis” of the European border regime by reflecting more generally on 
migration and borders. I do not intend merely to provide a descriptive historical 
contextualisation of the political economy or geopolitics that may pertain to 
better comprehending what the current situation is all about. Rather, I want 
to elaborate some theoretical tools for thinking about these more elementary 
analytical  categories—migration, borders, and so forth. In order to sustain a 
genuinely Marxist critique, it will be necessary to refuse to take for granted the 
very conceptual categories that organise this dominant discourse of the putative 
“crisis” of the European border regime. 
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The proliferation of “crisis”
When a ship transporting as many as 850 migrants and refugees capsized on 19 
April 2015, all but 28 of the vessel’s passengers were sent to their deaths in what 
appears to have been the worst border-crossing shipwreck in the Mediterranean 
Sea on record. This single event instantly established the prospect that 2015 would 
earn the dubious distinction of the most deadly year to date for would-be “asylum 
seekers” braving Europe’s borders. Subsequently, unnumbered capsized “migrant 
boats” and incidents of mass death turned that grim likelihood into a gruesome 
truth. These human catastrophes at sea have indisputably transformed the mari-
time borders of Europe into a macabre deathscape. Then, on 2 September 2015, 
social media as well as mass news media were briefly haunted by photographs of 
the corpse of a drowned Syrian child, soon identified as Alan Kurdi, washed ashore 
in Turkey after a failed attempt to reach the Greek island of Kos left at least 12 
people dead. Abruptly, the desensitising and rather cynical rhetoric of a “migrant 
crisis” began to recede in favour of appeals for compassion in the face of tragedy, 
accompanied by a reinvigorated (if ephemeral) language of “refugee crisis”.2
The putative “crisis” surrounding the influx of migrants and refugees in 
Europe—and the border spectacle that it generates3—is nowhere more extrava-
gantly put on display than in the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, for several years 
now, the European Union (EU) has converted the Mediterranean into a mass 
grave. The singularity or momentousness of the 19 April shipwreck was in fact 
only apparent, however, because it came as merely the most ghastly and most 
publicised in a long and unrelenting list of comparable episodes that have utterly 
banalised such human disasters, and which have continued during the ensuing 
months. Prior to the record-high death toll of 2015, untold tens of thousands of 
(ordinarily nameless) refugees, migrants and their children have been consigned 
to horrific, unnatural, premature deaths by shipwreck and drowning, often fol-
lowing protracted ordeals of hunger, thirst, exposure and abandonment on the 
high seas.4 Prospective migrant shipwrecks have perhaps been abated intermit-
tently (and inconsistently) during one or another period of heightened search 
and rescue operations by the various enforcers of the borders of Europe. But 
it is likewise probable that countless potential incidents of mass migrant and 
refugee deaths at sea have been circumvented by the sheer versatility of migratory 
2 De Genova and Tazzioli, 2016.
3 De Genova, 2013.
4 The most comprehensive database documenting migrant and refugee deaths during attempts 
to traverse the borders of Europe is “The Migrants’ Files”, a data project coordinated by 
Journalism++, which estimates the total number of European border deaths at more than 
30,000 since the year 2000—www.themigrantsfiles.com
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movements as migrants and refugees have sought alternate routes over land in 
the aftermath of such human tragedies. Hence, following the April shipwreck, 
although there continued to be a record-high volume of migration across the cen-
tral Mediterranean for months, there was also increasing evidence of a massive 
reorientation of migratory movement to land routes through the Balkans.
Of course, the option of illegalised travel by land routes is also treacherous: 
hunger, thirst, exposure, abandonment and the related lethal risks are not the 
exclusive travails of maritime journeys. On 27 August 2015, Austrian police 
discovered an abandoned meat truck on the highway at Nicklesdorf near the 
Hungarian border in which the bodies of 71 (mainly Syrian and Iraqi) migrants 
and refugees were decomposing in a sealed refrigeration compartment. 
Hundreds if not thousands of migrants and refugees have died of asphyxiation 
after extended periods of overcrowded transit by road or rail in sealed, unventi-
lated shipping containers and other means of clandestine (illegalised) transport 
over land. Others have merely met their doom after dangling precariously from 
the bottoms of moving trains and trucks. In addition, migrants must navigate 
the sometimes deadly violence of European border enforcement authorities, 
as well as their “non-European” counterparts, to whom they frequently out-
source the most aggressive sorts of border policing, and other European police 
forces routinely engaged in the everyday work of superintending migrant pre-
carity.5 Indeed, another form of border casualty arises from the lack of access to 
critical healthcare during extended periods of migrant transit, or the callous dis-
regard for migrant and refugee medical needs during detention or deportation. 
Furthermore, any consideration of the diffuse violence of these extended border 
zones must not neglect to consider the less systematic but no less systemic 
physical attacks of far right anti-immigrant racists.6
Regardless of the specific sites and forms of bordering, migrants’ and 
refugees’ lives have been mercilessly sacrificed—usually with callous disregard, 
occasionally with sanctimonious hypocrisy—in the interests of instituting a 
“new” Europe encircled by ever-increasingly militarised and securitised borders. 
Hence, following the reports of the 19 April shipwreck, as has happened repeat-
edly so many times before and since, European authorities were immediately 
catapulted into a political frenzy to redress this “tragedy of epic proportions”.7 
Predictably, however, despite the obligatory pronouncements of exalted 
humanitarian ideals, the ensuing discourse was compulsively preoccupied with 
“illegal” migration and the “criminal” predations of “smugglers” and “traffickers” 
5 Andersson, 2014.
6 Ataç and others, 2015; De Genova, 2015b.
7 Go to www.unhcr.org/5538d9079.html
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as pretexts for renewed and expanded tactics of militarised interdiction, includ-
ing proposals to bomb the coasts of Libya from which many maritime border 
crossers have been departing, or even to deploy ground troops.8 With a domi-
nant discourse that strategically likened migration across the Mediterranean 
(now equated with “human trafficking”) to slavery,9 the invocation of tragedy 
was cynically conscripted to supply the pretext for the fortification of various 
forms of border policing. This only acted to excacerbate the material and prac-
tical conditions of possibility for the escalation in migrant deaths, inevitably 
serving to channel illegalised human mobility into ever-more perilous pathways 
and modes of passage. If migrant “smuggling” is to be genuinely likened to slave 
trading, it is precisely the European authorities who have the power completely 
(and more or less immediately) to eliminate it—by reversing the very border 
enforcement that makes it an utter necessity. 
Part of the official debate turns on the question of various formulations of 
a kind of military humanitarianism, whereby European authorities may be 
charged with expanded responsibilities for the “rescue” of so-called “migrant 
boats” in distress on the high seas.10 Nevertheless, every ostensible rescue comes 
to be haunted for the illegalised border crossers by the ambiguous prospect 
of interdiction, apprehension and indefinite detention, with deportation as a 
defining horizon. Indeed, the commonplace deployment of the term “asylum 
seeker” inherently invokes the spectre of the allegedly “bogus” refugee seeking 
undue benefits or the “undeserving” migrant opportunistically claiming asylum. 
Indeed, people on the move across state borders are not in fact considered to be 
the genuine bearers of any presumptive (purportedly universal) “human right” 
to asylum but rather are always under suspicion of deception and subterfuge, 
produced as the inherently dubious claimants to various forms of institutional-
ised international protection. Similarly, the presumptive and pervasive depiction 
of refugees as (mere) “migrants” has been a crucial discursive manoeuvre in the 
spectacle of Europe’s border “crisis”. Little surprise, then, that begrudging ges-
tures of belated magnanimity towards those who may ultimately be granted the 
status of bona fide “refugees” by European authorities have been coupled with 
promises of speedy expulsion for those who may eventually be deemed to be 
only “migrants”—illegalised, presumably undesirable and deportable. 
Mass media news coverage has vacillated remarkably between depictions of 
a European “refugee crisis” and the label “migrant crisis” (an implicitly derisive 
8 Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016, and Traynor, 2015a.
9 For various contributions to the critique of the discourse of “slavery,” see www.opendemocracy.
net/beyondslavery.
10 Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016; Tazzioli, 2014; 2015a; see also Agier, 2011; Walters, 2011.
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term to the extent that it contributes to casting doubt over the validity of the 
refugees’ claims for asylum). Ambivalence and equivocation around the very 
labels by which various forms of human mobility are presumed to be knowable 
are telling signals of the ambiguities and contradictions that bedevil such termi-
nological categories as governmental contrivances.11 The vexed question of how 
most appropriately to characterise people on the move across nation state bor-
ders is commonly deferred to an eventual decision on the part of the “proper” 
governmental authorities, the ostensible “experts”, who purport to manage 
Europe’s border regime by sorting and ranking distinct categories of mobile 
people—in this case, assessing asylum claims and adjudicating the matter of 
who may qualify as a “legitimate” and “credible” refugee. Accordingly, until such 
a day of reckoning, all refugees tend to be reduced to the presumed status of 
mere “migrants”. Again, we are reminded that the very term “asylum seeker” is 
predicated upon a basic suspicion of all people who petition for asylum within 
a European asylum system that has routinely and systematically disqualified and 
rejected the great majority of applicants, and thereby ratifies anew the processes 
by which their mobilities have been illegalised.12
The ongoing “crisis” of European borders, therefore, corresponds above all 
to a permanent epistemic instability within the government of transnational 
human mobility, which itself relies upon the exercise of a power over classifying, 
naming and partitioning “migrants”/“refugees,” and the more general multiplica-
tion of subtle nuances and contradictions among the categories that regiment 
mobility. Indeed, such a proliferation arises as an inescapable effect of the mul-
tifarious reasons and entangled predicaments that motivate or compel people 
to move across state borders, or alternately find themselves stranded en route, 
temporarily but indefinitely stuck someplace along the way on their migratory 
itineraries. Refugees never cease to have aspirations. Against the dominant ten-
dency to figure them as pure “victims” (and thus as the passive objects of others’ 
compassion, pity or protection), they remain subjects who make more or less 
calculated strategic and tactical choices about how to reconfigure their lives and 
advance their life projects despite the dispossession and dislocation of their refu-
gee condition. In other words, in these fundamental ways, all refugees resemble 
“migrants”. And likewise, migrants are often “in flight” (or “fleeing”) from 
various social or political conditions that they have come to consider intolerable, 
thereby actively “escaping” or deserting forms of everyday deprivation, persecu-
tion or (structural) violence that may be no less pernicious for their mundanity. 
Hence, migration may often be a way to flee from social conditions marred by 
11 Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013; Tazzioli, 2013 and 2014.
12 De Genova, 2013 and 2016a.
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all the indignities of poverty and the routine but no less contemptible injustices 
of local hierarchies. Thus, many migrants also resemble “refugees”. Hence, the 
labels “migrant” and “refugee” commonly remain suspended in a state of tension 
and ambiguity, and may only be sorted into neat and clean distinctions through 
more or less heavy handed governmental interventions.
In the face of the resultant proliferation of alternating and seemingly inter-
changeable discourses of “migrant” or “refugee crisis”, the primary question 
that must be asked, repeatedly, is: Whose crisis? Describing the situation as a 
“crisis” appears to be precisely a device for the authorisation of exceptional or 
“emergency” governmental measures aimed at enhancing and expanding border 
enforcement and immigration policing.13 The spectacle of Europe’s “migrant 
crisis” is largely equated, consequently, with a crisis of control over the ostensible 
borders of Europe. One such European border, configured at the port of Calais in 
France near the entrance to the Channel Tunnel connecting Britain to the con-
tinent, has long been a site where migrants have regrouped their energies during 
more or less protracted periods of deceleration in the makeshift camps notori-
ously known as “the Jungle”.14 Following militant strike action by French port 
and ferry workers, a few thousand migrants and refugees charged the Eurotunnel 
barriers during the end of July 2015 in an effort to board trucks and trains head-
ing into Britain, provoking massive traffic delays. French authorities deployed 
riot police and the British constructed a new razor wire fence. Confronting this 
“Calais crisis”, British prime minister David Cameron reacted with promises of 
deportations and alarmist calls for more aggressive border policing to stop the 
migrant “swarm”, accompanied by a clamour of British tabloid newspapers call-
ing for the authorities to “send in the army”.15
Remarkably, by August, September and October 2015, literally from week to 
week and even day to day, the apparent “frontline” of European border struggles 
was repeatedly dislocated from one country to another, oftentimes further and 
further removed from any imagined outer periphery or frontier of “Europe”, in a 
dramatic dialectic of contestation between diverse migrant and refugee autono-
mies and a haphazard variety of tactics of bordering. These ostensible “frontline” 
dramas of the borders of Europe had moved decidedly inward, from the shores 
of Italy, Malta and Greece (or Greece and Bulgaria’s land borders with Turkey) 
to Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, then further still into Austria and Germany, 
and then back again to Croatia and Slovenia. By November, Germany, Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and 
13 De Genova and Tazzioli, 2016.
14 Millner, 2011; Reinisch, 2015; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013; Tazzioli, 2015b.
15 Elgot and Taylor, 2015. 
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Sweden had all begun to reintroduce temporary border controls. Pronouncements 
that the Schengen agreement was effectively “dead” became commonplace.16 
Then, the grisly spectacle of “terrorism” in Paris on 13 November 2015 supplied 
the catalytic event that could conjure anew the well-worn spectre of “Muslim 
extremism”. Ornamented with a (fake) Syrian passport conveniently deposited in 
the vicinity of one of the bombings, the horrific bloodbath in the heart of genteel 
Europe was quickly conscripted to allege that the seemingly uncontrollable refu-
gee influx was somehow providing cover for a nefarious ambush by the putative 
“enemies” of “civilisation” itself, and therefore that the “refugee” (or “migrant”) 
“crisis” truly represented a “security” threat, after all.17 Immediately following the 
events in Paris, within a few hours—and within days of having been branded a 
“lawless slum” that presents the risk of an “infiltration” of “guerrilla warfare”—the 
migrant and refugee camps at Calais were subjected to a suspected arson attack.18 
In the ensuing days, amidst the predictable (indeed, obligatory) speculations 
about a hydra-headed phantasm of “foreign fighters” and “home-grown extrem-
ists” travelling unhindered between combat zones in Syria and western European 
countries, France—long among the most stalwart advocates of European inte-
gration—stridently called for an unprecedented securitisation of the external 
borders of the EU’s Schengen zone. Within a week of the events, amidst police 
raids against Muslim “suspects” across multiple countries, and various calls for 
mass internment, deportations and the electronic monitoring of “suspects,” EU 
interior and justice ministers convened an emergency meeting and vowed to 
institute significantly tighter external border controls and expanded surveil-
lance over human mobility, of citizens and non-citizens alike. The urgent push 
to create new “hotspot” migrant and refugee reception and processing facilities 
(ie detention camps) at sites of illegalised border crossing, likewise, came now 
to be reimagined as a matter of perimeter defence against “terrorist” infiltration, 
with these borders  refigured as vital strategic sites for “culling terrorist wolves 
from refugee sheep”.19 Despite the fact that all of the alleged culprits of the Paris 
shootings identified were in fact (racialised “minority”) Europeans, the spectacle 
16 The Schengen agreement had established a European area free of border controls or passport 
checks for citizens from the 26 signatory countries. The Schengen accord pre-dated the 
European Union, but was incorporated into the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, with 
provisions for some member states to opt out. The Schengen Area includes 22 of the 28 EU 
member states, plus an additional four countries that are not EU members.
17 For more general discussions of the metaphysics of anti-terrorism and the rise of specifically 
anti-Muslim racism in the context of the production of discourses of a “Muslim menace”, see 
De Genova, 2007, 2010a and c, 2011, and 2015b; for a discussion of the Charlie Hebdo shootings 
in Paris in January 2015, see De Genova, 2016b, and De Genova and Tazzioli, 2015.
18 Campbell, 2015. 
19 Lyman, 2015. 
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of terror nevertheless served quite effectively as a virtually unquestionable pretext 
for dramatically reinvigorated border enforcement.
Soon thereafter, following the Paris events and numerous other incidents in 
2015 that fashioned the figure of Europe’s “Muslim” other in securitarian terms (as 
a “threat” of religious “fundamentalism,” “fanaticism” and “terrorism”), there fol-
lowed the abrupt outbreak in January 2016 of a moral panic over multiple sexual 
assaults during the New Year’s Eve festivities in Cologne. Allegedly perpetrated by 
“unruly mobs” of young men, casually characterised as being “of North African or 
Middle Eastern appearance” (and eagerly depicted as including recently arrived 
“asylum seekers”), this hysteria notably reinvigorated the racialisation of “Muslim” 
identity. In the face of these offences, the racialisation of “Muslims”/“Arabs” 
could now be represented in terms of unsavoury “cultural” differences that 
must be castigated and criminalised as transparently inimical to purportedly 
“European” values. Thus, once confronted with the palpable presence of recent 
arrivals of “Muslim” refugees and migrants, the apparent danger of “terrorism” 
was followed up with a much broader projection of gendered and sexualised 
menace, and “criminality” more generally. Even the tragic figure of three year old 
Alan Kurdi—the Syrian refugee boy whose death by border shipwreck became 
such a catalytic image in September—had by January (following the Cologne 
scandal) been viciously affiliated by the anti-Muslim racists of Charlie Hebdo 
with the grotesque spectre of ape-like (Muslim male) sexual predators. Whereas 
“anti-terrorist” suspicion follows a rather selective logic that has been mobilised 
for the purposes of more stringent (external) border enforcement, the propaga-
tion of the idea of allegedly “uncivilised” (“Muslim”) cultural difference has been 
promptly repurposed as a considerably more expansive problem of (internal) 
policing. Most importantly, the specific instances of sexual harassment and sexual 
predation have been immediately and emphatically conjoined to arguments for 
new powers to hasten the deportation of any and all “criminal” asylum seekers. 
Thus, refugees, formerly (if very briefly) figured as “deserving” of compassion and 
protection, have been very rapidly refashioned—first as potential “terrorists” who 
surreptitiously infiltrate the space of Europe, and then as potential “criminals” or 
rapists who corrode the social and moral fabric of “Europe” from within.
Border struggles
Notably, brutal border spectacles of “exclusion” have often exposed their own 
obscene dynamics of subordinate (illegalised) migrant “inclusion”.20 The various 
deployments of troops or riot police against migrants and refugees, the construc-
tion of razor wire barricades and assaults against migrant and refugee families 
20 De Genova, 2013.
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with tear gas, stun grenades and rubber truncheons, have been intermittently 
alternated with the outright facilitation of these same migrant movements 
through the provision of bus caravans and trains to expedite transit onward. 
Hence, state tactics of bordering have been abundantly shown to be convulsive 
reaction formations, responding always to the primacy of the sheer autonomy of 
migration.21 This was perhaps nowhere more dramatically manifest than the 
self-mobilisation on 4 September 2015 of refugees and migrants who had been 
encamped in Budapest’s Keleti railway station. Hungarian riot police had begun 
to deny migrants access to trains by which they aspired to travel on to Austria 
and Germany and had attempted forcibly to evacuate some of them. Following 
various skirmishes with the riot police in the makeshift refugee camp in the train 
station, and then a devious re-routing of trains by the authorities toward “transit” 
(detention) camps outside of the city, at least 1,000 migrants and refugees chant-
ing “Freedom!” indignantly coalesced into an ad-hoc protest march (quickly 
designated the “March of Hope”). Following the determined leadership of a one-
legged man, they proceeded onto a six-lane highway leading out of the country. 
This action promptly culminated in the Hungarian state authorities’ capitulation 
and compliance, albeit cynical and self-serving, with the urgency of the refugees’ 
determination to move freely forward on their chosen itineraries. The march was 
provided a police escort and then buses that would transport the unruly refugees 
and migrants further along on their journeys toward the next border. Likewise, 
Austria and Germany promptly confirmed that their borders were open.22 
Just the day before, Hungary’s right wing prime minister Viktor Orbán had 
proclaimed that Europe’s putative magnanimity towards refugees and migrants 
was “madness,” and argued that his attempts to close the border with Serbia with 
a razor wire fence were a matter of defending Europe’s “Christian roots” against 
a Muslim menace.23 Orbán has repeatedly declared baldly that Hungary does not 
welcome the prospect of granting residence to refugees, and Muslim refugees 
in particular. Earlier in the summer, Hungary had already announced its refusal 
to honour the Dublin regulation (by which other European signatory states 
could deport refugees to Hungary if they had first been registered as asylum 
claimants there). In short, much like Italy, Malta, Greece and Bulgaria previ-
ously, Hungary—now as a “frontline” defender of the borders of the EU—had 
21 For contributions to the elaboration of the critical concept of the “autonomy of migration,” 
see Mezzadra, 2011; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; Moulier Boutang, 1998; Moulier Boutang 
and Grelet, 2001. See also Bojadžijev and Karakayali, 2010; De Genova, 2010d; Karakayali and 
Rigo, 2010; Mitropoulos, 2006; Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008; Tsianos and 
Karakayali, 2010.
22 Hartocollis, 2015. See also Kasparek and Speer, 2015.
23 Traynor, 2015b. 
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come actively to resist the imperative that it do the proverbial “dirty work” of 
insulating the wealthiest EU member states from migrant and refugee mobilities 
seeking ultimately to resettle where they would have better prospects. 
Such junior partners in the fragmented and externalised bordering of 
“Europe”—including EU member states (such as Hungary), non-EU European 
states (such as several Balkan countries), and “non-European” states subcon-
tracted to pre-empt migratory movements before they ever reach European 
territory (from Turkey through North Africa, and even several sub-Saharan 
African countries)—have been poignantly depicted as “wardens of the European 
border regime”.24 Indeed, as in the case of Hungary, the more aggressive tactics 
in Europe’s extended border zones have sometimes served proactively (and 
 cynically) to redirect human mobilities onward toward other borders within 
other states’ jurisdictions. Then, in September, Hungary instituted emergency 
legislation in the border zone that threatened all border crossers with up to three 
years imprisonment, in flagrant disregard for any and all petitions for asylum—in 
an extravagant gesture of renewed commitment to its assigned role in enforcing 
the borders of “Europe”. “Paradoxically”, as Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer 
underscore, “Hungary is now being pilloried for its callous attempts at maintain-
ing the rules of the European border and migration regime, while Germany, 
regardless of its role as architect and driving force of that very regime, wins world-
wide acclaim for its humanitarian stance”.25 
Indeed, after having initially opened their borders to the mass movement of 
refugees and migrants, Austria and Germany were later prompted to reinstitute 
their own border controls in the face of the sheer volume and velocity of human 
mobility through Hungary, in order to better “manage” the “crisis”. Most impor-
tantly, despite their more draconian proclivities, Hungarian authorities opted to 
do nothing in the face of the refugees’ defiant march through Budapest except 
assist them on their way towards the border with Austria. Thus, the example 
of Hungary is merely the most dramatic instance of a recurrent vacillation 
between vicious violence and begrudging complicity on the part of state powers 
24 Ataç and others, 2015. On the wider topic of the externalisation of the borders of the EU, see 
Andersson, 2014; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles, 2011; Tsianos 
and Karakayali, 2010; Walters, 2009.
25 Kasparek and Speer, 2015. Subsequently, it was indeed Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel 
who re-initiated negotiations between the EU and Turkey that sought to reward Turkey with 
at least €3 billion in exchange for an expanded role in policing the external borders of the EU 
and the more effective containment of more than two million Syrians and other refugees and 
migrants. As Merkel put it, such measures would help to “keep people in the region”, which is 
to say, keep them out of Europe. In addition, the EU re-opened stalled negotiations regarding 
an extension of visa-free travel privileges to (qualifying) Turkish citizens, as well as the larger 
question of Turkey’s prospective admission to EU membership—Kanter and Higgins, 2015.
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seeking to reinstitute Europe’s borders in the face of the veritable incorrigibility 
of migrant and refugee movements. The “crisis” of border control and “migra-
tion management” may therefore be seen to be a crisis of state sovereignty that 
is repeatedly instigated, first and foremost, by diverse manifestations of the 
autonomous subjectivity of human mobility itself. 
What is fundamentally a moment of governmental impasse—in short, a 
“crisis” of territorially-defined state power over transnational, cross-border 
human mobility—has been mobilised and strategically deployed as “crisis” for 
the reconfiguration of tactics and techniques of border policing and immigration 
and asylum law enforcement. The uneven geopolitics of policing the borders of 
“Europe” and the heterogeneous tactics of various nation states for managing the 
resultant “crisis”, as we have seen, have riddled the project of European integration 
and border harmonisation with its own irreconcilable contradictions. Meanwhile, 
EU citizens have mobilised solidarity campaigns under the banner of “Refugees 
Welcome” and, most poignantly, organised automotive caravans openly to provide 
material and practical assistance to refugees in the completion of their cross-border 
journeys from Hungary into Austria and Germany, in flagrant defiance of legal 
prohibitions that would construe such acts of compassion and  solidarity as the 
“trafficking” or “smuggling” of “illegal” migrants, and hence as criminal offences. 
These actions have only served to amplify and telescope the fracture between the 
power of European states and large numbers of their own citizens who sided with 
the migrants’ and refugees’ struggles.26 In other words, such solidarity movements 
help to underscore a fracture between the presumptive sovereignty of state powers 
and the communities otherwise figured as the polities from which such claims to 
sovereign power are purported to be “democratically” derived. Thus, the larger 
conflictive processes of bordering “Europe” have generated a still larger political 
crisis for the European Union more generally. In this regard, it is the incorrigible 
autonomy of migration that has instigated a crisis for “Europe” as such.
A question of “Europe”
It is not difficult to see that the strategies and tactics of bordering, even when they 
are anticipatory and presumably regulatory—that is, whether they are intended 
to preempt or, alternately, to facilitate or even proactively channel one or another 
formation of border crossing—are always themselves embedded within larger 
reaction formations. In other words, the tactics of bordering can be understood to 
be reactions because they are responses to the prior fact of human mobility on a 
global scale, and consequently take shape in reaction to all the unpredictable and 
incorrigible dimensions of the elementary subjectivity and autonomy of migration. 
26 Ataç and others, 2015; Doppler, 2015; Kasparek and Speer. 2015; Stierl, 2015.
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The profound source of the intractable “crisis” of migration in Europe must con-
sequently be seen as a veritable struggle over the borders of Europe—migrants’ 
and refugees’ struggles to realise their heterogeneous migratory projects by exer-
cising their elementary freedom of movement, thereby appropriating mobility, 
transgressing the border regime as well as the struggle of European state powers 
to subdue and discipline the autonomy of migration.27 
Notably, the European border “crisis” has commonly been depicted in 
depoliticising language as a “humanitarian” crisis with its root causes always 
attributed to troubles “elsewhere”, usually in desperate and chaotic places osten-
sibly “outside” of Europe. These putative “elsewheres”, beyond the borders of 
Europe, are systematically represented as historically sanitised, which is to say, 
shorn of their deeply European (post)colonial histories as well as disarticulated 
from the European political and economic interests implicated in producing and 
sustaining their fractured presents. The refugees and migrants whose mobilities 
may be productively understood to appropriate the space of “Europe” neverthe-
less most commonly originate from places across Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia that were formerly the outright or de facto colonies of European masters.28 
In effect, migrants arriving in Europe today, much as has been true for several 
decades, originate from places that were effectively mass-scale prison labour 
camps where their forebears collectively contributed to producing the greater 
part of the material basis for the prosperity, power and prestige of Europe his-
torically. Virtually all migrations and refugee movements that today seek their 
futures in Europe have been deeply shaped by an indisputably European (colo-
nial) past. Furthermore, particularly for those who flee the devastation of war 
and military occupation or civil war—from Afghanistan or Iraq to Syria, Libya, 
Somalia or Mali (to name but a few)—the expansive human consequences of 
what Derek Gregory has incisively called the (US dominated, global) “colonial 
present” are likewise inextricable from their entrenched and enduring European 
(“post”-colonial) entanglements.29 Consequently, with the imposition, enforce-
ment and continuous reconfiguration of a “European” border over the last 
decades, a brave new “Europe” has, in effect, been busily redrawing the colonial 
boundary between a “European” space largely reserved “for ‘Europeans’ only” 
and the postcolonial harvest of centuries of European exploitation and subjuga-
tion.30 It is a new Europe fortified by very old and morbid cruelties. 
27 See Ataç and others, 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013; Karakayali and Rigo, 2010; Kasparek and 
Speer, 2015; Tazzioli, 2015b.
28 De Genova, 2016a; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013; Garelli, Sossi, and Tazzioli, 2013; Mezzadra, 
2006; Tazzioli, 2015b.
29 Gregory, 2004. See De Genova, 2010a.
30 De Genova, 2010c, and 2016a; see also van Houtum, 2010; and van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007.
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The spatialised partitioning of “Europe” from its putative “outside” notably 
begins within Europe itself, where the borders of “Europe” and the boundaries of 
“European”-ness have repeatedly been reinstituted in the uneasy borderlands that 
extend eastward. The legacies of the Cold War have ensured that some regions of 
“the East” of Europe have been, and largely remain, a crucial reserve of migrant 
labour, both within and across the borders of EU citizenship and mobility.31 This 
is particularly pertinent with regard to the Balkans, as Europe extends eastward 
towards Turkey as perhaps the most enduring Orientalised frontier. Hence, 
the recent prominence of the “Balkan route” for migrant and refugee move-
ments has been haunted by the awkward fact that several European countries 
themselves have yet to be admitted into the self-anointed circle of genuine and 
proper “European”-ness. Moreover, while there are intimations that some of these 
illegalised mobile subjects (Syrians in particular) may ultimately be  recognised to 
be credible and worthy recipients of the status of “refugees,” there are concurrent 
and insistent assurances by various European authorities that speedy deportation 
will be the rightful fate for others who may be rejected as mere “migrants”, notably 
including those originating in the Balkan countries themselves.32 The duplicitous 
insinuation here is that the devastating effects of the internecine violence of the 
Yugoslavian civil wars can now be assumed to be simply over and done with, and 
consequently that human mobilities from the Balkan region are purely “economic” 
in motivation. In addition, we must also be alert to the systematic deployment of 
“Balkan” and other “eastern European” regional or national-origin categorisations 
as evasive euphemisms for Roma (“Gypsy”) identities, in particular.33 As one of the 
foundational and constitutive “internal” racial others of Europe, the Roma are now 
reconstructed anew as a mobile (racialised, criminalised) menace to the stability 
and integrity of (western) European “civilisation”, whose flight from protracted 
poverty and entrenched marginalisation must not even conceivably be apprehensi-
ble as the mobility of “refugees” fleeing institutionalised persecution and structural 
violence in Europe.34
Consequently, the “crisis” of European borders is eminently political, in 
manifold ways. Most importantly, these struggles expose the fact that the borders 
of “Europe” are never reducible to anything resembling immutable, integral, 
internally consistent or objective boundaries corresponding to any self-evident 
31 Dzenovska, 2013.
32 Indeed, on 18 November 2015, EU member states Slovenia and Croatia, followed by non-EU 
countries Serbia and Macedonia, abruptly closed their borders to any would-be “asylum 
seekers” who could not provide identity documents confirming that they came from Syria, 
Iraq or Afghanistan—effectively segregating refugees according to national origin.
33 Fox, 2013; Grill, 2012; Hepworth, 2012.
34 Fekete, 2014; Hepworth, 2015; van Baar, 2011.
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“natural” fact of physical geography. Nor can these European borders be apprehen-
sible as simply the outward projections of a stable and coherent centre, whereby 
the socio-political, “cultural” or “civilisational” identity and spatial integrity of 
“Europe” may be presupposed in  contradistinction to a variety of othernesses 
“beyond” or “outside” the ostensible limits demarcated by those boundaries. 
Instead, Europe’s borders, like all borders, are the materialisations of socio-political 
relations that mediate the continuous production of the distinction between the 
putative “inside” and “outside,” and likewise mediate the diverse mobilities that 
are orchestrated and regimented through the production of that spatial divide. 
Thus, with respect to the abundant inequalities of human mobility, the borders 
of “Europe” are simultaneously entangled with a global (postcolonial) politics 
of race that redraws the proverbial colour line and refortifies “European”-ness as 
a racial formation of whiteness, and a comparably global (neoliberal) politics of 
transnational labour mobility and capitalist labour subordination that produces 
such spatialised (and racialised) differences, above all, to capitalise upon them.35 
To the extent that the European Union entails a transnational and partially 
supranational juridical and political formation, however, with an extraordinarily 
variegated and graduated spectrum of differential (and never perfectly harmo-
nised) arrangements that regulate and modulate its “internal” and “external” 
relations, a high degree of instability and mobility is inherent in the very exist-
ence of the externalised and virtualised borders that may now be characterised 
as “European”. Thus, “Europe” presents to us today a transnational and intercon-
tinental laboratory for the neoliberal regimentation and subordination of human 
powers and freedoms in relation to the space of the planet.
For many illegalised “asylum seekers”, braving the horrors of the European 
border regime comes only after fleeing from all manner of atrocities, persecution 
and misery in their countries of origin and, commonly, also in numerous other 
countries of “transit”, crossed en route to Europe, which have been materially 
and practically incorporated to various extents into the externalised policing of 
the frontiers of “Europe”. For most of these same refugees as well as many others 
who migrate in the quest to make a better life for themselves and their loved 
ones, the vicious severities of this extended and expansive European border-zone 
present a fierce endurance test, a preliminary apprenticeship in what promises to 
be a more or less protracted career of migrant “illegality”, precarious labour and 
deportability.36 However, whether these mobile subjects come to be governed as 
“refugees” or “migrants”, their needs, desires, and aspirations always supersede 
this death-defying obstacle course—albeit, at times, at the cost of their lives. 
35 De Genova, 2016a; De Genova and Tazzioli, 2015.
36 De Genova, 2015a; see also De Genova, 2002 and 2010b.
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Little surprise, then, that one mode of critical response to the European border 
regime’s ultimate responsibility for the April shipwreck was to invoke an analogy 
with the premier slogan of contemporary African American civil rights struggles 
in the United States—Black Lives Matter—by insisting that Migrant Lives Matter. 
Here, we are reminded that in the European context, the very figure of migration 
is racialised, even as dominant discourses of migration in Europe systematically 
disavow and dissimulate race as such.37 Haunted as Europe’s borders are by 
this appalling proliferation of (almost exclusively non-European/non-white) 
migrant and refugee deaths and other forms of structural violence and gener-
alised suffering, anyone interested in the politics of class and race today cannot 
avoid confronting the urgent and anxious question of the borders of Europe, and 
therefore must inevitably come to recognise that the question of Europe itself 
has become inextricable from the question of migration.38
A genuinely critical examination of borders and migration in Europe unset-
tles and destabilises “Europe” as taken for granted assumption, and instigates 
a confrontation with the problem of “Europe” itself.39 Much as the borders of 
Europe have been instituted and are constantly being policed for the sake of 
stabilising and purportedly “protecting” the space of “Europe”—first and fore-
most, and above all, as a preserve for the presumable birthright entitlements 
of “Europeans”—the unrelenting struggle over the autonomous mobility of 
“non-Europeans” across those symbolic and material boundaries continuously 
instigates a restaging of the borders of “Europe” as sites of their own subversion, 
and concomitantly, as the scene for the spectral undoing of “Europe” itself. The 
borders of Europe therefore present a premier site for the enactment and dis-
putation of the very question of and about “Europe”: the question of “Europe” 
itself has become inextricable from the question of migration.
Theorising the migrant-refugee-border “crisis”
In the foregoing, I have already begun to introduce a series of crucial con-
cepts that can serve the task of sustaining a viable critique. Now, I would like 
to approach our subject anew through a series of more directly, explicitly and 
emphatically theoretical gestures.
Borders are not inert, fixed or coherent “things”. Rather, as in Marx’s analysis 
of capital, borders are better seen as socio-political relations. What is at stake in 
these relations, which are indeed relations of struggle, is the rendering of borders 
37 Balibar, 1991a, b and c, 1992, and 2004b; De Genova, 2010c; 2016a and b; Goldberg, 2006.
38 Ataç et al, 2015; Balibar, 1991a,b and c, 2002, 2004a and b; De Genova, 2016a; Karakayali and 
Rigo, 2010; Mezzadra, 2006; Tazzioli, 2015b; Walters, 2009. 
39 De Genova, 2016a.
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into seemingly fixed and stable thing-like realities with a semblance of objectiv-
ity, durability and intrinsic power. Thus, the agonistic coherence and ostensible 
fixity of borders—their thing-like qualities—only emerge as the effect of active 
processes by which borders must be made to appear thing-like. In other words, 
they must be continuously objectified through repetitive practices and discourses. 
This very process of transposing what is in fact always an unresolved social rela-
tion into the semblance of a durable objective reality, however, implies that the 
objectification of borders is inherently fraught and antagonistic. The struggles at 
and around borders are struggles over the open-ended process of continuously 
objectifying borders (the process of making borders into objects, or objective 
facts), and thereby lending them the fetishised quality of unquestionable reali-
ties with a power unto themselves.
The objectification and fetishisation of borders, therefore, may be best appre-
hended if we appreciate that bordering is indeed a verb, and signals a process of 
border-making. Simply put, bordering—border-making activity—involves pro-
ductive activity, work, a kind of labour. The very acts and processes that produce 
borders, however, are the very same  socio-political activity that subsequently 
comes to look like some sort of natural and  inevitable result of borders as such. 
In other words, rather than see borders as the cumulative effect of the diverse 
acts of bordering (such as passport checks, policing, fences, etc)—instead 
of seeing “the border” as the product of all this work, in other words—we are 
induced to see all these heterogeneous human activities as merely subsidiary or 
derivative features that emanate from the apparently already-existing reality and 
objectivity of borders as such.
Once objectified thus, we may nevertheless recognise borders to be endur-
ingly productive. Borders, in this sense, may be considered to be a kind of means of 
production—for the production of space, or indeed, the production of difference 
in space.40 As enactments in and upon space, like any means of production, bor-
ders must themselves be produced and continuously re-produced. Yet, as a means 
of production, borders are generative of larger spaces, differentiated through the 
relations that they organise and regiment, facilitate or obstruct. Customarily, we 
have perhaps been inclined to conceive of these spatial differences as the differen-
tiation of nation state spaces, but as the convulsive supra-national space of the EU 
or the historical spaces of empire readily confirm, territorially-defined spaces of 
state formation have always been historically specific, contingent and heterogene-
ous. Nonetheless, the differences that borders appear to naturalise—between “us” 
and “them,” between “here” and “there”—are in fact generated precisely by the 
real incapacity of borders to sustain and enforce any rigid and reliable separations. 
40 See, generally, Lefebvre, 1991.
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Borders today seem to have become inextricable from migration, and are 
made to paradoxically appear to be both “the problem” and “the solution”. 
Borders, then, are notably perceived to be always-already violated, and thus 
perpetually inadequate or dysfunctional, if not frankly corrupted. And this is 
true in spite of ever-increasing border securitisation; indeed, the securitisation 
of borders only intensifies the perception that they are in fact always insecure, 
supplying the premier site for staging the perpetual demand for more securitisa-
tion.41 No number of borderzone arrests or deportations could ever be sufficient 
to sustain the semblance of “security” but rather only the seeming verification of 
a thankless and relentless task, a job that can never be completed. 
Here, as I have already argued, human mobility always comes first. Much as 
the subjective (creative, productive) force of labour necessarily always precedes 
its objectification as capital, the primacy of the autonomy and subjectivity 
of human freedom of movement is a recalcitrant and  obstreperous force that 
precedes and exceeds any border authority’s capacities for comprehensive 
regimentation and control. Once bordered, which is to say, once subjected to 
one or another tactic of bordering, the autonomy and subjectivity of the varie-
ties of human mobility that are thereby construed as border-crossing come to be 
known as “migration”. Thus, the autonomy and subjectivity of human mobility 
always instigates the reaction formations of bordering that convert particular 
forms of human mobility into the bordered social formations that we come to 
know (only retrospectively) as “migration”. Hence, if there were no borders, 
there would be no migrants—only mobility. As we have seen repeatedly with the 
recent translation of the putative “crisis” of the European asylum and migration 
regime into a veritable rebordering of the EU’s Schengen zone of “free mobil-
ity” through the reinstituting of border checkpoints in the name of enhancing 
“control”, the  ubiquity of migrant mobilities comes first; the ubiquity of borders 
and the diverse panoply of new techniques and technologies of border policing 
and immigration enforcement come always as a response on the part of the state. 
Indeed, migration regimes signify precisely the politicisation of the elemental 
human freedom of movement by subjecting human mobilities to state power.
These processes of subordinating human mobilities to the sovereign power 
of states and border regimes are fundamentally implicated in the larger produc-
tion of spatialised difference that I have identified with borders. That is to say, 
the bordering of mobilities is also a process for the production of difference, 
and its effects are differentially distributed. Therefore, although borders are 
ideologically constructed and celebrated as if their real purpose were simply 
“exclusion”—functioning as a barrier that “protects” what is inside by shutting out 
41 De Genova, 2011.
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what is outside—they operate in fact in ways that are much more equivocal, as 
amorphous zones that can be permeated and transgressed, and thus, as sites of 
encounter and exchange. In spite of the semblance of inadequacy or dysfunction, 
whereby borders appear to be wracked by “crises” because they are so persistently 
violated or transgressed, borders nonetheless serve quite effectively and predict-
ably as filters for the unequal exchange of various forms of value.42 The filtering 
character of borders is especially visible in those instances where the intensified 
enforcement of border crossings of easiest passage relegates illegalised migrant 
mobilities into zones of more severe hardship and potentially lethal passage, as we 
have seen with the conversion of the Mediterranean into a space of mass death. In 
a de facto process of artificial selection, these deadly obstacle courses serve to sort 
out the most able-bodied, disproportionately favouring the younger, stronger and 
healthier among prospective (labour) migrants, and disproportionately favouring 
men over women. The militarisation and ostensible fortification of borders, fur-
thermore, prove to be much more reliable for enacting a strategy of capture than 
as mere technologies of exclusion. Once migrants have successfully navigated 
their ways across such borders, the onerous risks and costs of departing and later 
attempting to cross yet again become inordinately prohibitive.
The more extravagant border policing becomes, the more in fact it partici-
pates in what I have called the Border Spectacle—persistently and repetitively 
implicating the materiality of border enforcement practices in the symbolic 
and ideological production of a brightly lit scene of “exclusion” that is always in 
reality inseparable from an obscene fact of subordinate (illegalised) inclusion that 
transpires in its shadows.43 Thus, in our efforts as radical activists to denounce 
the extremities and severities of plainly cruel modes of exclusion, we risk for-
feiting the critical responsibility to also detect how regulatory regimes produce 
regularities.44 Indeed, we risk failing to see that migrant “irregularity” (“illegal-
ity”) is itself a very regular and predictable feature of the routine and systematic 
functioning of border and immigration enforcement regimes, and thus, we risk 
an unwitting complicity with the supreme monologue of the Border Spectacle 
itself, by recapitulating its dominant theme of “exclusion”. Hence, rather than 
adopting political positions that treat borders as purely exclusionary and con-
sequently promoting such slogans as “Open the borders!” in the (liberal) spirit 
of advocating greater “inclusion”, what we really need to advance instead is the 
abolition of all borders as an elementary and defining feature of the capitalist 
42 Kearney, 2004.
43 De Genova, 2013; see also De Genova, 2002, and 2005, pp242-249.
44 De Genova, 2015a.
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state. Through borders, states legally and politically produce and mediate the 
social and spatial differences that capital may then capitalise upon and exploit.
Much of my previous work has similarly been dedicated to problematis-
ing any simplistic binary of “inclusion” and “exclusion,” in part through the 
elaboration of the concepts of “inclusion through illegalisation”45 and “inclusion 
through exclusion”.46 Here, it is important to underscore that the illegalisation 
or irregularisation of migrants—precisely, as labour—is always a kind of sub-
ordinate incorporation. This sort of inclusion may be best depicted as obscene 
precisely because it is not merely concealed, but also selectively revealed. What 
constitutes the obscene is not that it remains hidden but rather that it gets 
exposed. Thus, the spectacle of border policing stages the regulatory regime of 
immigration enforcement as always besieged by the inexorable “invasion” or 
“inundation” of “illegal” migrants, and in this manner routinely serves to verify 
precisely the regularity of “irregular” migrants’ obscene inclusion and the sheer 
banality of their despised presence within the space of the state.47
If borders are productive of differences in material and practical ways, then it 
is crucial to note that they not only involve a physics (through the mobilisation 
of various practices and material technologies of bordering) but also sustain a 
definite metaphysics. The metaphysics of borders is centrally implicated in the 
particularisation of the political (as a feature of the global relation of labour and 
capital). Politics is thus made particular according to distinct histories of struggle 
in specific places. But the generalised dominant form for this global political rela-
tion involves a universalisation and normalisation of the “national” state form. 
The “national” (territorially defined and delimited) form of the state has there-
fore become the standard framework of “politics” in a nationalist world order. 
Simply put, borders constantly reinforce the ideological image of a world com-
posed of “nations” and “national” states, to which all territory—and importantly, 
all people—must consistently and exclusively correspond. This metaphysics of 
borders plays a role on an effectively global scale. Indeed, we may be reminded 
here of Hannah Arendt’s memorable depiction (following the Second World 
War) of “the new global political situation” as “a completely organised human-
ity” resembling a “barbed-wire labyrinth”.48 Borders, as we have come to know 
them, do not only distinguish the official outer limits of state territory and insti-
tute the division between one space of sovereign power and another, but also 
subdivide the planet as a whole. In so doing, borders also subdivide humanity 
45 De Genova, 2002, p439, and 2005, p234.
46 De Genova, 2010b and c.
47 De Genova, 2013.
48 Arendt, 1968, pp297, 292.
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as a whole.49 Consequently, in a world where the workers truly have no country, 
they are nonetheless made to appear to be first and foremost the “nationals” (or 
“citizens”) of one or another state. 
Borders cross everyone, including those who never cross borders. As social-
ists, then, we must confront this fundamental problem: Will we finally become 
the (witting or unwitting) accomplices of border policing, even if only by 
uncritically adopting the nationalist standpoint of the state that presumes to act 
as the sovereign power behind any given border regime? Or alternately, as genu-
ine internationalists, will we align ourselves conscientiously on the side of our 
own elementary freedom of movement and reject all (nation) state borders, and 
struggle deliberately for the fundamental reconfiguration of the relation between 
the human species and the space of the planet?
49 De Genova, 2010b.
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